JANE E. DUTTON, SUSAN J. ASHFORD, REGINA M. O'NEILL, KATHERINE A. LAWRENGE
8 min
Issue selling is the process by which individuals—often middle managers—draw the attention of top leadership to specific problems or trends that require change. Rather than viewing organizational change purely as a top-down mandate or a discrete, major event, this study portrays it as a continuous, pluralistic, and emergent process. By examining 82 accounts of issue-selling episodes, the researchers identified the practical moves managers use to navigate their organization's political and structural landscape.
The authors categorize issue-selling moves into three primary areas: packaging, involvement, and process. Packaging involves presenting issues through the logic of a formal business plan, framing them as incremental rather than disruptive, and tying them to already-valued organizational goals like profitability or market image. Involvement moves are equally critical; successful sellers know who to involve (and when) to build a coalition. Finally, process moves—specifically persistent effort and opportunistic timing—allow sellers to ride waves of organizational momentum, waiting for the right moment when leadership is 'ripe' for a particular change.
The most distinctive contribution of this research is the identification of three types of contextual knowledge that empower effective issue selling. First, relational knowledge helps managers understand the stakes and territories of colleagues to avoid resistance. Second, normative knowledge involves knowing the organization's implicit 'rules of the game,' such as which forums are legitimate and how data is expected to be presented. Third, strategic knowledge ensures that proposals align with the broader competitive landscape and top-level priorities of the firm. Together, these forms of practical intelligence allow managers to function as 'orchestrators' of change from below.
This paper shifts the focus of change management literature from the heroic actions of top executives to the behind-the-scenes, intelligent efforts of middle managers. It suggests that organizations are likely to be more innovative if top leadership intentionally builds cultures that support, rather than suppress, these bottom-up initiatives. By understanding the 'theories-in-use' that managers already possess, organizations can better design structures that mobilize this vital internal energy for strategic renewal.
Sam: Wishes are interesting. That's managers saying, in hindsight, "this would have helped."
Alex: Right, and the authors coded those regrets separately. Two coders built the categories from the transcripts. A second coder checked part of the material, with about 85 percent agreement.
Sam: Give me the moves, then. What stood out?
Alex: The most common is what they call using the logic of a business plan. Numbers, charts, a coherent structure, bottom-line impact. More than three in four managers mentioned it, and it showed up far more in successful stories than failed ones.
Sam: Make that concrete. What does a successful pitch sound like?
Alex: One manager wanted more critical care space in the intensive care unit. She built a full business plan, financial, marketing, and demographic. Then she tied it to two concerns. First, patient care: they couldn't serve all their patients without the space. Second, money: turning patients away, as she put it, struck quite a chord.
Sam: So she attached her issue to things leadership already cared about.
Alex: That's what they call bundling, tying your issue to goals that already matter. It's the clearest pattern in the data. Tying an issue to profitability appeared in 18 successful accounts. It appeared in only 2 unsuccessful ones. And several managers describing failures said they wished they'd done it.
Sam: What else held up, and what didn't?
Alex: Framing a change as incremental, small rather than sweeping, seemed to work in their telling. One manager reflecting on a failure said he lumped too much together and should have tried smaller pieces. Persistence was mentioned twice as often in successes as failures. Involving peers at your own level, and keeping your boss informed, leaned toward success too. Timing came up mostly as regret. Many managers in failed attempts wished they'd picked their moment better.
Sam: And the ones that didn't separate?
Alex: Raising an issue repeatedly over months was common, but showed no clear link to success. Preparation, or doing your homework, appeared about equally in both. The authors read that as relevant but not sufficient. Involving outsiders, like consultants, was also split.
Sam: You said there was a second finding, about knowledge. Where does that come in?
Alex: They didn't plan to study it. It emerged from the stories. Managers kept referring to things they needed to know to make a move work. The authors sort that into three kinds. Relational knowledge is who cares, who's affected, who has power. Normative knowledge is how things are done here: which forums count, how data gets presented, what's been tried before. Strategic knowledge is the organization's goals and competitive pressures.
Sam: So bundling only works if you know what the goals are. That's strategic knowledge doing the work.
Alex: That's their argument. And relational knowledge shows up in one manager's story. She pitched the same issue differently to each audience. With the chief operating officer, she talked about the physical case. With physicians, it was patient care. With nurses, it was their work. She skipped finances with nurses because she knew they didn't want to hear it.
Sam: Their old model must have included things that didn't show up at all.
Alex: Yes. Emotional or novel framing, two-sided arguments, making top management feel responsible: managers rarely mentioned them. Concern about protecting your image was also much less visible than predicted. The authors note managers may just not admit those concerns to an interviewer.
Sam: There's a darker reading here. If what works is business logic and small steps, radical ideas never get through.
Alex: The authors make exactly that point. They see a conservative bias. Sellers may avoid issues that lack a business case or can't be split into small commitments. Without top management stepping in, they expect few radical changes to bubble up. They suspect this is typical of bureaucratic organizations.
Sam: How far should I trust all this? It's one hospital, and people telling stories about themselves.
Alex: That's the main limit, and the authors say so. It's one fairly bureaucratic organization, historically sheltered from competition. The accounts are retrospective. They can't check whether moves actually happened or caused anything. And they admit it's hard to separate real moves from talk about what should work. Self-serving memory could inflate the success stories. They also only asked about strategic issues.
Sam: So it's a map of what managers believe works, not proof that it does.
Alex: That's a fair reading, and it matches how the authors frame it. They call the accounts imperfect traces of what works.
Sam: So who should read the full paper, and where should they start?
Alex: Anyone studying middle managers, strategic change, or upward influence. Start with the section on contextual knowledge and its three kinds. Then read the discussion of the conservative bias, and the practical point for top managers: they shape the context sellers work in.
Sam: And for everyone else, the one line to carry around?
Alex: Getting heard from below isn't just a good idea well argued. It's knowing who cares, how things get done, and what the organization already wants.
Sam: Worth remembering the next time you pitch upward.