Arvid Lindh, Leslie McCall
8 min
This review synthesizes current social science literature on how an individual's class position shapes their political orientations in rich democracies. The authors move beyond the "death of class" thesis, arguing that while class politics are transforming, they remain highly relevant. They propose a multidimensional framework that integrates economic and sociocultural domains while accounting for both the demand-side (what citizens want) and the supply-side (what political institutions offer).
The authors categorize political opinion into three domains: economic, sociocultural, and political. In the economic domain, class differences persist; manual workers consistently express stronger support for government redistribution than managers. However, there is growing scholarly interest in "social investment" policies (e.g., education, childcare) which bridge the interests of different class segments.
In the sociocultural domain, the authors highlight a "progressive’s dilemma" where traditional working-class and newer sociocultural professional classes may find themselves in tension, particularly regarding immigration and multiculturalism. The paper stresses that these attitudes are not static but are shaped by status threats and political elite rhetoric, which can divert attention from economic inequalities.
A key contribution of this review is the emphasis on the political domain, specifically "supply-side" factors. The authors contend that declines in class voting are not necessarily evidence of the decline of class interest, but rather the result of political parties becoming unresponsive to the needs of the working and lower-middle classes. Political institutions—including media, electoral systems, and party platforms—actively shape which class interests are mobilized and which are ignored or suppressed.
Understanding how class influences political opinion is essential for explaining current trends like the rise of non-mainstream parties, populist movements, and growing political apathy. By highlighting the interdependence of economic, cultural, and institutional factors, this review provides a roadmap for researchers to move past unidimensional analyses and better capture the complex ways class continues to drive democratic politics today.
In many high-income countries today, scholarly interest in the politics of class has coincided with growing economic inequality, rising support for non-mainstream political parties and candidates, and increasing flows of immigration. We review social science research on the views of different class segments vis-à-vis economic, political, and sociocultural issues, finding greater scholarly attention to the interdependence of economic, social, and political concerns and preferences than arguably was the case even a few years ago. Our main aim is to synthesize and critically evaluate this rapidly expanding literature, but we also provide empirical data on class differences and similarities in political opinion across eighteen countries, and we pinpoint several areas of research that are in need of further empirical, methodological, and theoretical inquiry. (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality Working Paper)
Alex: What is the clearest numerical result? And what do they actually count as support for redistribution?
Sam: Their redistribution measure combines responsibility for reducing income differences with responsibility for providing a job to everyone who wants one. It's scored from zero to a hundred. In every country examined, manual workers were more supportive than managers and business professionals.
Alex: Providing jobs is broader than taxing the rich. So we should hear this as their particular measure of egalitarian government responsibilities, not a direct reading of tax preferences. How large was the gap?
Sam: The average gap was about fifteen points. For comparison, the average individual-level standard deviation was about twenty-six points. These are adjusted comparisons from country-specific regressions, accounting for age, gender, public or private employment, urban or rural location, and religiosity.
Alex: That's a consistent descriptive difference, but it doesn't identify why the groups disagree. What explanations does the review consider?
Sam: Economic risks and rewards are central: income and employment security help anchor preferences. But the review also considers people's own class identities, concern for others, missing information, and national context. Wealth may matter too, yet standard surveys rarely measure it well, especially at the very top.
Alex: And if we change the policy question from redistribution to protection against sickness or old age, does the same divide remain?
Sam: Support for that social insurance is high across classes and countries, including the United States. The authors see this as supporting the argument that universal programs can sustain broad welfare-state legitimacy. Workers and middle-class groups both have reasons to value protection from insecurity.
Alex: So a survey focused only on redistribution could miss agreement on substantial public programs. But agreement over economic protection doesn't guarantee a political coalition. Where do social issues enter?
Sam: That's the second part of the review. Workers tend to favor redistribution more than middle-class groups, while being more conservative on many sociocultural issues. Those are issues involving social relations and values, including immigration and sexuality. These relative differences can persist even as societies become more socially liberal overall.
Alex: That sounds like a familiar explanation for workers supporting the right: social concerns outweigh economic interests. Do the authors accept that explanation?
Sam: They treat it as incomplete, not necessarily false. Economic and social concerns can be intertwined. Arguments about whether immigrants deserve welfare benefits, for example, concern both group membership and access to resources. Calling them purely cultural can build the conclusion into the measurement.
Alex: If a measure of threatened status includes worries about economic standing, comparing it against a narrow income measure won't cleanly separate culture from economics. Is that one of their methodological objections?
Sam: Yes. They ask whether social status and economic hardship are measured with comparable reliability and validity. They also challenge explanations that treat group identities as fixed political instructions. Preferences can change with context, and parties can mobilize some concerns while neglecting others.
Alex: That brings institutions back in. A person's priorities don't tell us which choices are available, or which issues a campaign will emphasize.
Sam: The authors call that the supply side: political institutions shaping available ideas, policies, and choices. The demand side is what citizens want. Studying only individual attitudes risks missing how parties, existing policies, and organized interests help shape those attitudes and translate them into political behavior.
Alex: What evidence suggests this translation is uneven? People might hold different views without feeling that government excludes them.
Sam: The review examines external political efficacy: whether people feel government hears and responds to people like them. In nearly all countries, workers feel less heard than middle-class groups, including sociocultural professionals. It also reviews research finding that policy decisions often favor affluent preferences when income groups disagree, although that literature remains contested.
Alex: Feeling unheard could encourage support for an anti-elite party. But it could also encourage staying home. Can the review distinguish those outcomes?
Sam: Not definitively. The authors say unresponsiveness may feed populism, understood here as favoring rule by the people against corrupt elites. But resentment can target economic elites too, and move left or right. They also flag how little research links unresponsiveness to apathy rather than populist support.
Alex: So the institutional argument is plausible, but how far can we trust it as an explanation of declining class voting?
Sam: Further as a research agenda than as an established causal account. Longitudinal studies reviewed here show considerable stability in class differences in opinion in several countries. But definitive evidence that growing party unresponsiveness caused changes in voting is lacking. The authors want individual surveys combined with institutional data and careful comparative research.
Alex: Who should read the full review, and where should they begin?
Sam: Researchers studying inequality, political attitudes, voting, or representation should read it. Start with the Economic Domain's comparison of redistribution and social insurance. Then read the Political Domain on government responsiveness and the gap between opinion and voting. For everyone else, remember this: class interests don't disappear just because elections stop expressing them clearly.
Alex: Thanks for listening.