Felix Mallin, James D. Sidaway
4 min
In contemporary policy and academic circles, the term 'geoeconomics' is frequently attributed to the strategist Edward N. Luttwak, who popularized it in the early 1990s to describe a post-Cold War world where the 'grammar of commerce' replaced the 'logic of war.' This paper challenges this narrative, arguing that geoeconomics is not a modern invention but a concept with a deep, largely forgotten history. By tracing the term back to the early 20th century, the authors reveal that the current 'geoeconomics boom' is merely the latest iteration of a long-standing intellectual struggle to define the relationship between space, power, and the global economy.
The authors employ a genealogical method to uncover how geoeconomics has been deployed across different historical contexts. They identify early uses of the term in German intellectual life, particularly during the Geopolitik era following World War I. Figures such as Arthur Dix, who authored the first book-length account of geoeconomics in 1925, viewed the concept as a way to map the terrestrial environment for economic opportunity and national utility. The study further tracks the term's reappearance in Cold War-era US military training materials, showing that it has consistently emerged during periods of intense debate regarding national destiny and strategic competition.
Rather than viewing geoeconomics as a simple replacement for geopolitics, the authors argue that the two are dialectically related. Throughout the 20th century, proponents and critics have used geoeconomics to either bolster state power or to critique imperialist expansion. The paper suggests that the recent surge in interest—evidenced by the creation of numerous 'geoeconomics' centers in major think tanks—reflects an ongoing, unresolved tension between market-based strategies and traditional geopolitical security concerns. By historicizing these debates, the authors provide a critical framework for understanding how contemporary global power is conceptualized and enacted.
Abstract Towards the end of the Cold War, the vocabulary of global power, space and economy received a qualitative update. Amongst the terms rapidly gaining prominence since the early 1990s has been the notion of geoeconomics, the coining of which has frequently been attributed to the strategist Edward N. Luttwak. In his interpretation, it signified a transition away from Cold War ideological and military geopolitical competition towards commerce and market‐based geo‐power. Over the past three decades, a ‘geoeconomics boom’ set in, characterised by think tanks and a varied body of politico‐economic literature making extensive use of the term. Conventionally treated as a neologism, the provenance and earlier iterations of geoeconomics, some dating back more than a century, have been largely ignored by both celebratory and critical accounts. In this paper, we trace and contextualise these earlier instances, leading us to the Geopolitik era in Germany and references to geoeconomics in the United States in the decades after WWII. We thereby offer a critical genealogy of geoeconomics, conceptualised as an object of definitional struggle. Proponents of the term sought to position it variously as a tool of national economic cohesion and competition or as a way of understanding and harnessing shifting global power relations, whilst others sought to subsume geoeconomics to geopolitics. These past struggles track forward into ongoing dialectical tensions between geoeconomics and geopolitics as competing but related geostrategic visions.
Sam: In the late 1800s, Germany was industrializing rapidly and trying to establish itself as a major power in a world already dominated by Britain and France. Some thinkers felt that existing frameworks — like straightforward "economic geography," which just described where resources and trade routes were located — were too narrow. They wanted a concept that captured how geography, politics, and national ambition all interacted. So thinkers like Wilhelm Röpke proposed "geoeconomics" to fill that gap. Crucially, they rejected abstract, universal rules in favour of something more specific: the idea that each nation's history and physical geography should shape its economic strategy.
Alex: So from the very beginning, the concept was tied to a particular kind of national anxiety — the fear of being left behind or outmaneuvered by rival powers.
Sam: Exactly. And that's what makes the paper's argument so pointed. When a government today announces a new "geoeconomic strategy," they're reaching for a framework that was built to serve those same fears more than a hundred years ago. The paper suggests we'd be better served by acknowledging that lineage — rather than treating each new iteration as a fresh start.
Alex: It's a useful reminder that the ideas shaping foreign policy today have long histories, and understanding those histories changes how we evaluate them. Thanks for listening to ResearchPod.