Ida Bæk Hjermitslev, Florence So
5 min
This paper investigates how government collapses triggered by scandals—rather than policy disagreements—affect voter attitudes. While existing political science literature extensively covers why coalitions terminate for strategic or policy reasons, there is a gap in understanding how voters react when a government breaks down due to misconduct, corruption, or personal blunders. The authors argue that such terminations signal a lack of governing competence, which should negatively impact both the responsible party's electoral prospects and the public's broader satisfaction with democracy.
To test this, the authors utilize a natural experiment provided by the 2019 Austrian 'Ibiza' scandal, which led to the collapse of the coalition between the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Because the Austrian National Election Study was in the field when the scandal broke, the researchers employed an Unexpected Event during Survey Design (UESD) to measure voter sentiment immediately before and after the coalition's termination.
The study finds that voters are highly discerning. Following the scandal-based termination, voters significantly reduced their support for the FPÖ (the party responsible for the scandal) but did not change their support for the ÖVP (the coalition partner). Furthermore, the termination caused a measurable decline in citizens' satisfaction with how democracy functions in Austria. Interestingly, the authors also analyzed a separate corruption probe involving the ÖVP leader where the coalition did not collapse; in that instance, the scandal negatively impacted support for both parties and lowered evaluations of overall government performance. This suggests that when a coalition terminates, the act of breaking up may help 'quarantine' the blame to the responsible party.
This research highlights a significant 'negative externality' of government instability. While parties may view coalition termination as a strategic necessity to distance themselves from a scandal, the breakdown itself damages the public's faith in the democratic process. The findings suggest that voters do not just punish parties for policy failures; they also hold them accountable for the integrity of the governing process, and they are capable of distinguishing between the party at fault and its partners.
Abstract In established democracies, governing parties are expected to govern effectively. Government terminations that result from breaking the rule of law, policy blunders, or disastrous policy performances have the potential to damage voters’ perceptions of how well democracy functions in their countries. Yet, current research on coalition politics has not examined the specific consequences of scandal-based government terminations on voters’ attitudes toward politics and the quality of democracy. We analyze the attitudinal impacts of scandal-based government terminations and argue that this type of termination reduces citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy functions in their countries and their propensity to vote for the party responsible for the scandal. We also examine whether scandal-based coalition terminations negatively impact voter perceptions of the government’s performance. We test our arguments by relying on a recent scandal that took place in Austria: the so-called Ibiza scandal, which caused the early termination of the coalition between the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). At the time the scandal broke, the Austrian National Election Study was in the field. We utilize an Unexpected Event during Survey Design to test if the scandal had consequences for voters’ perceptions of the parties and their collaboration. The supporting evidence for our argument calls for the need to revive research on government termination and to initiate a new line of research on how government breakdowns affect citizens’ democratic attitudes.
Sam: That's a more nuanced picture of voters than you usually hear. The common assumption is that people just react emotionally to chaos.
Alex: The paper does suggest voters can be more discerning than that, at least in this case. But the authors are careful to note one important limit. While the government's performance rating held steady, citizens' broader satisfaction with how democracy itself was functioning did decline.
Sam: So the firewall protected the party's reputation, but the sheer fact of the government collapsing still left people feeling less confident in the democratic system as a whole.
Alex: That's the tension the paper highlights. Voters can assign blame accurately to specific actors, but they still feel the cost of instability. Accountability and systemic trust don't always move together.
Sam: You mentioned this was considered a particularly demanding test of the theory. What made it so?
Alex: The party at the centre of the scandal had a very loyal, polarised base of supporters. People who back that kind of party tend not to shift their views easily, even when faced with clear evidence of wrongdoing. So if the reputational firewall held up even under those conditions, it suggests the pattern isn't a fluke specific to one easy case.
Sam: It's like stress-testing a bridge with the heaviest load you can find. If it holds, you have more confidence it'll hold in general.
Alex: That's a reasonable way to think about it. The authors suggest this points toward a broader pattern in how voters process political crises, though they're appropriately cautious about generalising from a single case.
Sam: So the headline finding is that coalition collapse doesn't automatically mean collective punishment. Voters, at least in this instance, were capable of distinguishing between the party that caused the problem and the party that responded to it.
Alex: And that distinction matters, both for how we understand voter behaviour and for how political parties might think about crisis management. Cutting ties with a scandal-ridden partner isn't just a moral choice—the evidence here suggests it can also be a strategically rational one, in terms of protecting your own standing with the public.
Sam: Though the broader democratic cost is still real. People feel the disruption even when they assign blame correctly.
Alex: Which is perhaps the most important nuance in the whole paper. Precision in blame doesn't fully offset the damage to public confidence in the system. The two things are related, but they're not the same.
Sam: That's worth sitting with.
Alex: Thanks for listening to ResearchPod.