Abhijit V Banerjee, Esther Duflo
5 min
The 1990 World Development Report from the World Bank defined the “extremely poor” people of the world as those who are currently living on no more than $1 per day per person. But how actually does one live on less than $1 per day? This essay is about the economic lives of the extremely poor: the choices they face, the constraints they grapple with, and the challenges they meet. A number of recent data sets and a body of new research allow us to start building an image of the way the extremely poor live their lives. Our discussion builds on household surveys conducted in 13 countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, and Timor Leste (East Timor). These surveys provide detailed information on extremely poor households around the world, from Asia to Africa to Latin America, including information on what they consume, where they work, and how they save and borrow. We consider the extremely poor—those living in households where the consumption per capita is less than $1.08 per person per day—as well as the merely “poor”—defined as those who live under $2.16 a day—using 1993 purchasing power parity as benchmark. In keeping with convention, we call these the $1 and $2 dollar poverty lines, respectively.
This paper investigates the daily economic realities of the extremely poor—defined as those living on less than $1.08 per day—using household survey data from 13 countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Rather than focusing on aggregate poverty statistics, the authors examine how these households allocate their resources, manage risks, and navigate the absence of functional markets and infrastructure.
A central finding is that the extremely poor do not spend their limited income exclusively on maximizing caloric intake. Instead, they allocate significant portions of their budgets to non-food items, including tobacco, alcohol, and, notably, festivals and social ceremonies. The authors observe that even when income increases, the demand for additional calories is relatively low. Furthermore, investment in education is minimal, largely because public schools are often perceived as low-quality or dysfunctional, leading some parents to opt for private alternatives despite the added cost.
The poor are frequently active entrepreneurs, yet their businesses operate at an extremely small scale with minimal assets and little to no paid labor. This lack of specialization is a recurring theme; households often juggle multiple occupations to mitigate risk and manage time. The authors argue that this behavior is a rational response to the lack of formal credit, insurance, and reliable savings vehicles. Without access to formal banking, the poor struggle to accumulate the capital necessary to grow their businesses or protect themselves against health shocks, often relying on expensive informal credit markets or social networks that provide only limited protection.
By documenting these specific behaviors, the authors challenge the notion that the poor are simply passive victims of circumstance. Instead, they highlight how the lack of institutional support—such as secure property rights, functional health infrastructure, and accessible financial services—forces the poor into suboptimal economic strategies. Understanding these constraints is essential for designing policies that can effectively help households move beyond subsistence.
Alex: Which makes the absence of financial infrastructure even more damaging. If they're capable of planning, but the tools for long-term planning don't exist —
Sam: Then the environment itself is the binding constraint. Without a secure place to save, cash is effectively a liability — social obligations and immediate pressures will consume it. Without insurance, years of accumulated assets can be wiped out by a single illness. The rational response is to stay liquid, stay diversified, and never commit capital to anything that requires a long time horizon to pay off. [[RP_SECTION:commitment-and-infrastructure|Commitment and Infrastructure]]
Alex: The fertilizer study in Kenya makes this concrete, doesn't it?
Sam: It does, and it's one of the load-bearing pieces of evidence in this literature. Farmers weren't using fertilizer — not because they didn't understand its value, but because they couldn't hold onto the small amount of cash needed by the time planting season arrived. When researchers offered a commitment device — a voucher purchasable right after harvest — uptake increased substantially. The voucher didn't add money; it removed the window during which the money could be redirected. It converted a future intention into a present commitment.
Alex: That's a meaningful distinction. The constraint wasn't knowledge or even resources in the moment — it was the inability to protect a decision across time.
Sam: Right. And this is where the paper's argument gets most uncomfortable for standard economic theory. A lot of our models assume a baseline of stability — that agents can make plans and expect those plans to survive contact with reality. For households operating at this margin, that assumption fails. Every decision is made in the shadow of the next potential shock. [[RP_SECTION:policy-and-structural-constraints|Policy and Structural Constraints]]
Alex: So where does this leave the policy question? If the constraint is structural — missing markets, missing institutions — what does the evidence actually support?
Sam: The paper is careful here, and appropriately so. There's a genuine identification problem: it's hard to disentangle whether these households don't specialize because they're poor, or whether they remain poor because they can't specialize. The causal arrow is difficult to establish cleanly. What the evidence does support is that commitment savings products and micro-insurance, delivered at scale, could shift behavior — not by changing preferences, but by changing the environment in which those preferences operate.
Alex: So the intervention isn't about teaching people to plan differently. It's about building the infrastructure that makes long-term planning viable in the first place.
Sam: That's the core of it. The tragedy Banerjee and Duflo document is not a deficit of agency. It's that the environment systematically denies these households the basic tools — credit, insurance, secure savings — that would allow rational agents to act on longer time horizons. The capacity is there. The infrastructure is not. And that gap is where the research points.
Alex: A finding that should give pause to anyone who frames poverty primarily as a behavioral problem.
Sam: Exactly. The behavior looks irrational from the outside, but it is a coherent response to a genuinely irrational environment. Thanks for listening to ResearchPod.