The Motivation Question

John Broome's Rationality Through Reasoning aims to solve the 'motivation question': how does believing one ought to do something cause one to intend to do it? Broome rejects the idea that this happens automatically, arguing instead that we exercise our agency through 'enkratic reasoning'—a specific process of reasoning from normative beliefs to intentions. Southwood evaluates this account, focusing on Broome's treatment of 'ought' beliefs, enkratic rationality, and enkratic reasoning.

Southwood identifies several non-trivial difficulties in Broome's proposal. First, he argues that Broome's test for the 'central ought' is too restrictive, as it excludes moral beliefs that are not accompanied by beliefs about what one 'unqualifiedly' ought to do, despite these beliefs clearly triggering the motivation question. Second, Southwood challenges 'Enkratic Permission,' a principle Broome uses to justify the rational permissibility of forming intentions based on normative beliefs. Southwood contends that this principle is both unnecessarily restrictive and fails to satisfy a plausible test for rational basing, suggesting that no enkratic basing permission is valid.

Southwood further critiques Broome's account of enkratic reasoning. He argues that Broome's sufficient conditions for reasoning do not guarantee that an agent is manifesting agency in the correct way. Using a 'peculiar game' thought experiment, Southwood shows that one could follow Broome's enkratic rule without responding to a genuine choice situation. He proposes that for reasoning to be truly agency-involving, it must be aimed at settling a specific question, such as whether to perform a particular act. Finally, Southwood suggests that enkratic reasoning is likely rare and atypical, which undermines its role as the primary explanation for how ordinary agents align their intentions with their normative beliefs.